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Highlights 
• We use the US financial services industry as a laboratory to investigate the returns to acquirers’ 
shareholders when earnout contracts are used instead of a single up-front payment. 
• Propensity score matching (PSM) is used to deal with selection bias concerns with regard to the 
endogeneity of the decision of financial institutions to use such contracts. 
• Acquirers enjoy higher short- and long-run abnormal returns when using earnout contracts compared 
to conventional methods of payment. 
• The retention of management of targets plays an important role in determining acquirer returns. 
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1. Introduction 
 The managers of financial institutions face valuation risk when negotiating the price and payment 
method in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A).1 One way of reducing this risk is to use an earnout contract. An 
earnout contract is an agreement where part of the purchase price of a firm is paid at some agreed point in the 
future (normally three years after the close of the acquisition). The earnout contract involves payments in 
two stages. The first payment is made at the time of the M&A announcement (in the form of cash, stock, or a 
combination of cash and stock), while the second (usually in cash) is delivered upon satisfactory 
performance of the target after a pre-determined period has elapsed following the M&A announcement. 
Earnout financed deals mostly involve privately held target firms in which valuation risk, due to asymmetric 
information problems between the involved parties is likely to be higher compared to deals involving listed 
targets. The target firm’s management in earnout financed deals is often retained during the post-merger 
period.2 
 Earnout contracts share the risk of possible mis-valuation due to the enhanced likelihood of 
information sharing between the contracting parties. Furthermore, earnout contracts can reduce integration 
problems in the post-merger period as the target’s management team, that are regularly a small group of 
shareholders, are incentivized to maximise performance during the post-merger period (so as to increase the 
odds of receiving the deferred payment). However, earnout contracts can lead to opportunistic behaviour on 
the part of bidding and target firms. Retained management may engage in short term high risk behaviour in 
order to maximise cash flows and assure the contingent payment, while the acquirer has an incentive to 
adjust or distort reported performance in order to lower the size of the contingent payment. Ultimately, the 
monitoring costs associated with earnout contracts may offset the possible gains. 
 In this paper we use the US financial services industry as a laboratory to investigate the returns to 
acquirers’ shareholders when earnout contracts are used compared to M&A’s financed with single up-front 
payments. Our choice of industry is justified on the grounds that the assets held by financial institutions 
(such as banks, insurers, and asset management companies) are often opaque and difficult to value (Morgan, 
2002; Jones et al, 2012; Flannery et al 2013). The use of earnout contracts in mergers involving financial 
institutions may lessen the likelihood of mis-valuation. As a consequence, we conjecture that acquirers using 
earnout contracts will experience higher returns than their non-earnout counterparts. These superior returns 
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arise from the ability of earnout contracts to reduce information asymmetries between merging institutions 
and thus increase the likelihood of successful integration. 
Client relationships are often of importance in the financial services industry, however they are portable, 
and can move with particular managers, especially after takeover (Bengtsson and Delbecque, 2011). 
Therefore, we also investigate whether the retention of the target firm’s management in M&A using earnout 
contracts is a source of value creation in the post-merger period. We conjecture that acquirers experience 
higher returns in cases where the target’s management team is retained. This is because the retained 
management of the target institution can help alleviate problems associated with integrating the merged 
entities, and thus increase the likelihood of a successful deal. 
We employ a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we compare the mean announcement period 
abnormal returns of a portfolio consisting of deals where earnout contracts are used with a control portfolio 
of deals financed with a single up-front payment. Appropriate control deals are identified using propensity 
score matching (PSM). This allows us to match deals where earnout contracts are used with similar non-
earnout deals. In addition, the PSM method addresses selection bias concerns with regard to the endogeneity 
of the decision of financial institutions to use earnout contracts. The least biased estimation of propensities in 
the PSM is further confirmed using the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) approach. 
In the second stage, we conduct a multiple regression analysis of the impact of the use of earnout 
contracts on acquirer short- and long-run abnormal returns, while controlling for several transaction- and 
merging institution-specific features simultaneously. For the investigation of the long-run gains of acquirers 
we employ the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) methodology in which the benchmark portfolio is 
either a control portfolio to earnout deals from the non-earnout group of deals (as identified via the PSM and 
RB methods) or a stock market index. 
The main findings of our analysis indicate that the use of earnout contracts in acquisitions involving 
financial institutions leads to significantly higher acquirer abnormal (short- and long-run) returns, compared 
to counterpart acquisitions (control deals) which do not use earnout contracts. Earnout contracts along with 
several transaction- and merging institution-specific characteristics (such as target listing status, the relative 
size of the transaction, and the mid-industry segments of merging institutions) are important in determining 
the short- and long-run abnormal returns of acquirers. We also find that the higher the size of the deferred 
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(earnout) payment, as a fraction of the total transaction value, the higher the acquirers’ gains in the short- and 
long-run. This provides strong evidence that the use of earnout contracts leads to higher acquirer value gains. 
We also find that both the acquirer short- and long-run gains increase when the management team of the 
target institution is retained in the post-acquisition period. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following three ways. First, this paper is the first to explore 
the effects of earnout contracts on the returns of acquirers when both entities operate in the financial services 
industry. Second, we assess the impact of the retained management team of the target on the abnormal 
returns gained by acquirers in the post-acquisition period. Third, we address selection bias concerns with 
regard to the endogeneity of the decision of financial institutions to use earnout contracts. In order to do so 
we employ PSM and RB methods to identify the benchmark portfolio when assessing long-run returns of 
acquirers. 
Overall, the results presented in this paper show that investors react more favourably to the use of 
earnout contracts in acquisitions involving financial institutions, relative to conventional payment methods. 
We find this is driven by deals in which the management team of the target institution is retained in the post-
merger period, and when the value of the earnout contract to total deal value is high. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review salient literature. Section 3 
outlines the methods used to conduct the empirical analysis. In Section 4, we describe the data and present 
the findings of the paper. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature  
The method of payment in M&A signals information regarding the merging institutions valuations during the 
pre-announcement period, the value of the deal (including the M&A bid premium), as well as the value of 
the newly formed institution. For the acquirer in cash-financed deals, and for both the acquirer and target in 
stock-exchanged deals, information asymmetry creates valuation uncertainty and leads them to demand a 
discount to the apparent value of the acquiring or the target institution (Travlos, 1987; Eckbo, Giammarino 
and Henkel, 1990). As a result, announcement period abnormal returns are significantly higher in cash-
financed than in stock-financed M&A, for both the acquiring and the target institutions shareholders 
(Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey, 2008).3 A cash offer is made by acquirers who attach a high value to the 
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target institution under their control, and by so doing signal their confidence that the target will be of high-
value during the post-merger period (Fishman, 1989). Less confident acquirers, instead, prefer to use stock as 
a medium of payment or an earnout contract. 
Evidence relating to the impact of earnout contracts on the short-run gains of acquiring firms is limited. 
A small number of studies utilise samples of non-financial firms to investigate the impact of earnout contract 
usage on the gains of acquirers in the short- and the long-run. Kohers and Ang (2000) show that earnout 
financed deals yield positive short- and long-run abnormal returns for acquiring firms’ shareholders. These 
abnormal returns are superior to those realised in transactions financed by cash or stock. Datar, Frankel, and 
Wolfson (2001) show that foreign acquirers use earnout less frequently than domestic acquirers. The 
managers of foreign target institutions appear to be unwilling to accept deferred payments owing to possible 
future conflicts arising from: the discrepancies in calculations of the payment amount and performance goals, 
and differences in accounting practices and other corporate governance mechanisms. Barbopoulos and 
Sudarsanam (2012) show that UK acquirers of non-financial firms using earnout contracts enjoy higher 
short- and long-run abnormal returns compared to other payment methods. Such benefits are greater in deals 
involving firms operating in industries where intangible assets are an important source of the value to 
acquirers. Cain, Denis, and Denis (2011) examine the determinants of earnout use in deals involving US non-
financial firms, and show that the size and the length of the earnout contract are greater when the uncertainty 
surrounding the value of the target is higher. 
Overall, previous literature suggests that the use of earnout contracts leads to significantly higher short- 
and long-run abnormal acquirer returns compared to non-earnout payment methods. Higher gains are 
attributed to the expected ability of earnout to enhance the extent of information sharing between merging 
institutions. This is reflected on the short- and the long-run abnormal returns of the acquirer. 
Earnout contracts often stipulate the retention of the target institution’s management team during the 
post-acquisition period. As such the retention of valuable human capital can reduce problems associated with 
integrating the merged entities in the post-acquisition period. As a result, the earnout may significantly 
contribute to value creation in both the immediate and post-acquisition period. Similarly, the post-acquisition 
performance of acquirers involved in deals of financial institutions using earnout contracts and retaining the 
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target’s management is expected to yield higher returns compared with deals that employ other financing 
methods. 
 
3. Methods 
Measurement of announcement period abnormal returns 
We follow previous studies (including Fuller, Netter, Stegemoller, 2002; Faccio, McConnell, Stolin, 2006) 
with similar sample characteristics to calculate short-run excess returns of acquirers using the market-
adjusted model as follows:4 
 =, , ,-i t i t m tAR R R  (1) 
Where: ARi,t is the excess return of acquirer i  on day t ; Ri.t is the return of acquirer i  on day t  measured as 
the percentage change in price index of acquirer i ; and Rm,t is the market return defined as the percentage 
change of the corresponding Datastream value-weighted market index for the United States on day t. The 
short-run cumulative abnormal return is the sum of the excess returns of the 5-days (t-2 to t+2) surrounding 
the day of the announcement of the acquisition, t, which is day 0, as outlined in Equation 2 as follows: 
 !"#$ = "#$,'()*'+(,*  
 
(2) 
The mean short-run abnormal return (mean of CARi) of acquirers is analyzed by the method of payment used 
to finance the deals (non-earnout and earnout). We then compare the mean CARi of the portfolio comprising 
deals financed with earnout to a control portfolio of deals using non-earnout methods of payment. The 
appropriate control deals are identified using the PSM method, based on a logistic regression. This is 
validated using the Rosenbaum-bounds method. A standard univariate analysis on the short-run abnormal 
returns of deals that are financed with earnout and non-earnout payments (cash, stock, and mixed) is also 
performed. 
 Bias can arise if there is an endogenous relationship between the choice to use an earnout contract 
and other covariates used in our empirical analysis. To address such concerns, we identify a group of 
acquisitions which share similar characteristics to our sampled acquisitions using an earnout contract from 
the non-earnout group. Matching directly on individual covariates is likely to be infeasible if the number of 
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covariates is large. Consequently, we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM), which allows us to aggregate 
all covariates to derive a single score using a likelihood function. In the current setting, PSM permits us to 
assess whether earnout (treated) deals influence acquirers’ short-run abnormal returns differently than 
control deals obtained through the PSM from the non-earnout (untreated) group of transactions, after 
ensuring the absence of any selection-concerns/bias. We select control acquisitions from the non-earnout 
group, and assess whether the short-run and long-run abnormal returns arising from these deals differ from 
deals where earnout contracts are used. 
The effect of earnout financing is assessed by investigating what the announcement period and long-run 
returns of acquirers that used earnout contracts would have been if they had not used earnout. The 
conditional probability of earnout contract use, p(x), is estimated in a logistic regression based on several ex-
ante institution- and transaction-specific characteristics ‘x’ as follows: 
 ( ) ( )= =1|p x pr EA x  
(3)  ( )£ = £0 1| 1pr EA x
  
Where EA the event dummy is assigned a value of 1 where earnout contracts are used, and 0 otherwise (non-
earnout). The conditional probability is computed from a discrete choice model such as logit (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). 
We choose variables (‘x’) that are likely to affect the decision of merging institutions to use earnout 
contracts (Cain, Denis and Denis, 2011). These include the: age of the acquirer; size of the acquirer; target 
size (or transaction value of the deal); listing status of the target; target domicile; mid-industry segments of 
the merging institutions; and acquirer capital-to-assets ratio. The propensity score estimator is validated with 
the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) method.5 Using the RB method allows us to examine the sensitivity of our 
results derived from matching on the effect of an omitted/unobserved covariate from our propensity score 
estimator (Rosenbaum, 2002). The RB method relies on the sensitivity parameter Γ, which, in the context of 
our analysis can be represented as a measure of the relative odds of earnout (treated) and non-earnout 
(control) as in Equation 4: 
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(4) 
Pi (Pj) refers to the treated probability of the treated (control) unit. Overall, the RB method measures how 
influential a missing covariate needs to be in order to invalidate the treatment effect in the observational 
study.6 
 
Measurement of post-acquisition period abnormal returns 
The post-acquisition period excess returns of acquirers are analyzed based on the buy-and-hold-abnormal-
returns (BHAR) approach. This approach represents the most commonly used method to determine long-run 
abnormal returns in event time (Barber and Lyon, 1997). BHAR are derived as the difference between the 
buy-and-hold-return of an investor in the acquiring company and the buy-and-hold-return of the benchmark 
portfolio. The benchmark portfolio is the corresponding Datastream value-weighted market index 
(TOTMKUS) for the US (shown in Equation 5). To ensure that the estimation of the BHAR is robust, the 
benchmark portfolio is also identified based on PSM (augmented with RB) (shown in Equation 6): 
 ( ) ( )
+ +
= =
= + - +Õ Õ, , ,1 1
s T s T
i t i t m t
t s t s
BHAR R R  (5) 
 ( ) ( )
+ +
= =
= + - +Õ Õ, , _ ,1 1
s T s T
i t i t control firm t
t s t s
BHAR R R
 
(6) 
Equations (5) and (6) calculate the BHAR for a period of 12, 24, and 36 months following the month of the 
acquisition announcement. 
 
Multiple regression cross-sectional analysis 
We further examine the impact of earnout contracts on returns using multiple regression analysis, where the 
effects of other factors shaping the short- and long-run acquirers’ returns are analyzed simultaneously. These 
factors include the: acquiring institution’s age; acquiring institution’s size; transaction value of the deal; 
relative size of the transaction; acquiring institution’s growth opportunities; target institution’s listing status; 
mid-industry segments of the merging institutions; target institution’s domicile; size of the earnout contract 
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as a proportion of the total deal value (relative earnout value); length of the earnout contract; and common 
equity as percentage of total assets. A variable that represents a sub-group of deals using earnout contracts in 
which the target institution’s management team is retained during the integration period; a dummy variable 
that denotes control deals from the non-earnout group (as identified via PSM and RB); and a dummy variable 
representing the merger wave or the timing of the acquisition announcement are also included. Appendix A 
provides a full definition of the variables used and their respective sources. The estimable models are: 
 
a e
=
= + +å
1
N
i i i
i
CAR X  (7) 
 
a e
=
= + +å
1
N
i i i
i
BHAR X
 
(8) 
Where: CARi denotes short-run cumulative abnormal return of acquirers, as estimated in Equations 1 and 2; 
‘α’ measures the short-run excess returns to acquirers’ shareholders after controlling for the effects of all the 
other covariates, ‘X’. BHAR denotes buy-and-hold-abnormal-returns of acquirers as estimated in Equation 5. 
‘α’ measures the long-run excess returns to acquirers’ shareholders after controlling for the effects of all the 
other covariates that have been used in previous literature, denoted ‘X’, in addition to the ones that are 
specific to this study. 
 
4. Data and Results 
Data 
The sample comprises acquisitions announced by US acquirers between 1st of January 1986 and 31st 
December 2009, which are recorded by the Security Data Corporation (SDC) database. The sample period 
ends at 31st of December of 2009. The SDC database records 230,067 acquisitions involving US acquirers of 
any listing status over the sample period. For a deal to remain in the sample, the acquirer must be a listed US 
financial institution with a market value of at least $1 million (four weeks prior to the announcement of the 
deal), while the target institution must be an institution operating in the financial sector. Domestic and 
foreign, public, private, and subsidiary targets are included in the sample. To avoid small transactions 
minimum deal value is set at $1 million. We consider completed deals only. To ensure that the acquirer 
enjoys control over the target institution’s assets, we consider only acquisitions in which at least 50 percent 
  
 
11 
of a target institution’s equity is acquired. Cases where more than one deal is announced by the same 
acquirer within a 5-day window (window analyzed) are excluded in order to avoid the confounding effects of 
multiple acquisitions. For an acquisition to be included in the sample, the daily stock return index, inclusive 
of dividends, and the market value of the acquirer should be available from Datastream. Once all the 
aforementioned criteria have been satisfied, 2,973 acquisitions remain.7 Data relating to whether the target’s 
management team is retained post-acquisition is collected from Factiva and SEC filings. The length of the 
earnout contract is collected form LexisNexis and InvestEgate.  
The annual distribution of acquisitions of financial institutions in our sample covers three major merger 
waves since the mid-1980s (Table 1). The first merger wave was in the late-1980s, while the second and 
largest wave was observed in the late-1990s. The most recent merger wave commenced in 2003 and stopped 
abruptly with the onset of the financial crisis.8 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 records the frequency of earnout contract use. Similar to other payment methods, the use of 
earnout contracts is correlated with overall acquisition activity. Clearly, stock offers represent the preferred 
medium of acquisition financing, while cash offers are relatively scarce by comparison. Almost 3% of 
transactions use earnout contracts, while the remainder (≈97%) are financed with non-earnout methods of 
payment. The rate of earnout contract use in our study is slightly below the 3.9% reported by Cain, Denis 
and Denis (2011), the 4.1% reported by Datar, Frankel and Wolfson (2001) and the 5.6% reported by Kohers 
and Ang (2000) in previous studies of US non-financial firms. Finally, Table 1 shows that the use of earnout 
contracts is more prevalent in acquisitions involving targets (such as asset management companies) where 
the retention of management teams with specialized skills is of importance in the post-acquisition period 
(Bengtsson and Delbecque, 2011). 
Table 2 provides a description of type of merging institutions. In the majority of transactions, merging 
institutions share the same mid-industry segments (shown in the diagonal of the Panels A and B). This is 
confirmed in Table 3 (Panel A) where acquisitions involving financial institutions are more common where 
merging institutions share the same mid-industry segment (SMIS). Panel C (Table 2) further depicts the mid-
industry relatedness of merging institutions involved in acquisitions of financial institutions that use earnout 
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contracts. In our sample, deals involving insurance companies1, banks and asset management firms more 
often use earnout contracts. Deals of domestic target institutions are more common than those of foreign 
targets. Table 3 (Panel A) also reveals that the majority of acquisition transactions in our sample involve 
unlisted targets. 
(Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here) 
Average transaction value varies significantly between: (a) non-earnout and earnout financed 
acquisitions, (b) acquisitions involving listed and unlisted target institutions, (c) domestic and foreign 
acquisitions, and (d) SMIS and different mid-industry segments (DMIS deals). On average, cash financed 
deals are significantly smaller compared to those financed with stock or mixed or where earnout contracts 
are used. Within stock financed deals, acquisitions of listed target institutions represent the higher average 
transaction values. The average transaction value for DMIS deals is much higher than SMIS counterparts, 
irrespective of the listing status of the target institution. Similarly, the average transaction value in foreign 
transactions is much higher, compared to that for domestic transactions, irrespective of the listing status of 
the target institution. 
Acquirers in deals using earnout contracts are larger than counterpart deals where earnout contracts are 
not used. Panel B shows that acquirers of listed target institutions are much larger than those acquiring 
unlisted targets. Finally, the average deal value for unlisted target deals using earnout contracts is much 
higher than that of listed counterparts. 
Table 3, Panel B also highlights that the value of the earnout contract (earnout size) is much larger in 
acquisitions involving financial institutions in DMIS compared to same mid-industry segment (SMIS) 
counterparts, further indicating the risk exposure of the DMIS acquirer to ex-ante target valuation risk and 
possibly integration risk ex-post. The average length of the earnout contract in acquisition transactions of 
financial institutions is approximately three years, which is similar to that reported by previous studies 
analyzing non-financial firms. 
 
 
                                                
1 Staikouras (2009) finds significant abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of mergers between banks and 
insurers. By bidder type, banks earn significant positive returns, while insurance counterparts experience losses.  
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Propensity Score Matching estimates on announcement period abnormal returns 
To ensure that the comparative analysis between acquirers’ abnormal returns from earnout and non-earnout 
financed acquisitions is likely to be free of sample-selection bias, we employ the PSM method to identify 
similar (in terms of covariates and/or level of a deal’s valuation riskiness) deals to those that have been 
financed with earnout, yet have been financed with a non-earnout. 
We estimate the propensity scores for 87 earnout and 2,886 non-earnout financed acquisitions. The 
results are reported in Table 4, Panel A. Our findings demonstrate that earnout financing occurs more 
frequently in acquisitions involving privately held targets and in deals involving better capitalised acquiring 
financial institutions. The results reported in Panel A also show that earnout contracts are used most 
frequently in deals involving asset management companies, and less frequently in deals involving banks and 
foreign targets.9 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
We select acquisitions from the non-earnout group based on the 1:1 Matching Ratio (MR) and perform 
that selection for 1%, 5%, and 10% Absolute Probability Difference (APD) between the earnout and non-
earnout groups’ propensity scores, respectively. We also match acquisitions based on the 2:1, 3:1, 5:1, and 
10:1 MRs for the same APDs. Results based on our various matching exercises are reported in Table 4, 
panels C to E.10 
Panel B reports the results of the RB sensitivity analysis that is based on the 1:1 MR and 1% APD 
(which offers the most precise matching exercise). 
In Panel B, Γ = 1 indicates that the odds of receiving the treatment are equal between two matched units 
(the case of randomised experiment). However, if the earnout group yields higher CAR due to an unobserved 
covariate that allows the treated observations to behave differently than the control ones (CARearnout ≠ 
CARnon-earnout), which may also exert a significant impact on the choice of earnout, then only the conclusions 
derived from an accurate matching exercise (insensitive to the impact of a missing covariate) will allow an 
unbiased estimation of CAR difference, or treatment effect. Our results suggest that doubts over the strength 
of the treatment effect (the strength of the impact of earnout financing on acquirer returns), or the statistical 
significant difference in estimated CAR means (2.52%), would emerge if an unobserved covariate would 
cause an increase in the odds of assignment of earnout by about 1.35 or 35%. Specifically, an unobserved 
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covariate needs to influence the odds of receiving the treatment (earnout) by 35% in order to invalidate the 
treatment effect (at 5% level).11 Therefore, our matching exercise and also our propensity score estimator 
(logit model) offer considerably consistent estimates of the effect of the treatment resulting from matching 
(provided the low sensitivity of our derived conclusions to the presence of a missing/unobserved covariate). 
As highlighted previously PSM identifies control deals conditioned on the propensity score p(x). It is 
therefore important to ensure whether the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of all the 
relevant covariates across both the earnout (treated) and non-earnout (control) groups. We conduct the two-
sample t-test for comparing the distributions of the covariates’ means (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). The 
results (reported in Table 4, Panel C) suggest that the distributions of covariates between earnout and non-
earnout groups are not statistically different.12 
Our evidence suggests that the earnout group (treated) yields higher acquirer short-run abnormal returns 
compared to the control group based on the PSM method, but such differences are sensitive to the MRs and 
the APDs (Panels D and E). More specifically, the 1:1 MR exercise shows that the earnout group 
outperforms the matching group by 2.52% in 1% APD, whereas the same differential remains strong in 3:1, 
5:1 and 10:1 MRs (differentials of 1.52%, 1.72% and 1.76% respectively, significant at 5% and 10% level).13 
These results confirm that earnout financed deals significantly outperform the control (non-earnout) ones.14 
Overall, these findings find higher acquirer abnormal returns when earnout contracts are used in acquisitions. 
 
Univariate analysis of announcement period abnormal returns 
The results from the standard univariate analysis of acquirer short-run gains are reported in Appendix B. 
These are organized according to the: method of payment; listing status of the target institution (unlisted 
(which involve private and subsidiary) and listed); domicile of merging institutions; and mid-industry 
segment of the merging institutions. 
Acquisitions involving financial institutions yield significantly higher announcement period abnormal 
returns to the acquiring institution’s shareholders in the presence of earnout financing, relative to financing 
on single up-front payments (diff = 2.56%). We also obtain a highly significant differential (=2.94%) in 
acquirer abnormal returns between stock financed and portfolios of deals where earnout contracts are used. 
Deals financed with earnout also outperform their counterparts using cash offers by a differential of 1.88%. 
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We next compare the short-run acquirer abnormal returns between earnout and non-earnout (as a group 
and by different methods of payment) deals that involve unlisted (private and subsidiary, together and 
individually) and listed targets and find that earnout acquisitions of unlisted target institutions outperform 
their counterparts using other forms of payment. The portfolio of acquisitions financed with earnout yields 
significantly higher returns compared to deals financed with cash or stock. These results hold for domestic 
deals (Panel B), as well as for same-mid-industry segments deals (Panel D). For example, Panel C shows that 
earnout is not used in foreign acquisitions. On average, foreign deals involving listed target institutions that 
are financed with single up-front payments destroy value for US acquirers. 
Overall, the standard univariate analysis shows that the use of earnout contracts in acquisitions 
involving financial institutions generates significant gains to acquirers’ shareholders compared to gains when 
cash, stock, and mixed single up-front payments are used. The gains accrued to the shareholders of acquiring 
institutions are clearly driven by the listing status of the target institution, the target institution’s domicile, 
and the mid-industry segment of the merging institutions. 
 
Multiple regression analysis of announcement period abnormal returns 
Table 5 reports the findings of our multiple regression analysis, controlling for the impact of several factors 
that could affect acquirers’ abnormal returns at the 5-day announcement period. To avoid possible multi-
collinearity between different sets of covariates, Equation 7 is estimated in a nested (reduced) form with 
various combinations of covariates. The results obtained corroborate the significant impact of the use of 
earnout in the determination of acquirers’ returns in the short-run. Specifically, the EA coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant different across Models 1 to 3 and 7 to 9. This pattern again supports the finding 
of higher short-run returns to acquirers’ shareholders when earnout contracts are used. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
We further examine whether earnout financed deals announced during the merger wave of 1998-2000 
had a significant impact on acquirers’ returns compared to counterparts announced outside this merger wave. 
Results based on Models 7 and 8 (that include EA and MWD, merger wave dummy) confirm the 
insignificant contribution of earnout contract usage on acquirers’ returns (Model 8). This result is consistent 
with the view that the earnout method of payment is less likely to be used during mergers waves or periods 
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of optimism where merger valuation risk arising from information asymmetry is downplayed. Moreover, we 
test whether the distribution of non-earnout (control) deals (identified via the PSM and RB methods and 
representing the counterfactual or comparable group) generate acquirer losses. We find these results accord 
with our unreported-univariate findings. Models 9 to 11 confirm the results from the PSM method discussed 
earlier in the paper. Specifically, the EA coefficient is positive and significant (Model 9), while the CODM 
(control deals dummy) coefficient is negative. This supports the view that the group of deals where earnout 
contracts are used tends to significantly outperform the control group.15 
We now turn our focus to the wealth effects of the relative size of earnout payment. Therefore, we 
divide our earnout sample based on the proportion of the payment that is contingent on future performance in 
order to examine whether merger valuation risk considerations dictate the earnout method of payment. By so 
doing, we construct the ‘REAV’ variable, the ‘high REAV’ and ‘low REAV’ variables (defined in Appendix 
A). Deals under the category of ‘high REAV’ (‘low REAV’) are considered as high (low) risk or more (less) 
opaque, given the nature of assets held by financial institutions. In fact, as Cain, Denis and Denis (2011) 
suggest, the REAV increases with the uncertainty of target institution’s value, or disagreement between the 
merging institutions regarding the precise value of the deal. ‘REAV’ is positive and significant (Model 4) 
indicating that the larger the deferred payment, the higher the short-run acquirer abnormal returns. This may 
stem from the reduction of merger valuation risk and the potential synergy gains as a result of the strong 
target incentives to meet certain and pre-agreed performance related goals in the integration period. The size 
of the ‘REAV’ coefficient (0.058) appears significantly larger than the coefficient of the earnout dummy 
variable (the EA coefficient ranges from 0.019 to 0.024). Further analysis suggests that the size and strength 
of the ‘REAV’ coefficient is driven by the ‘high REAV’ deals (Model 5). These results are not affected by 
the stage of the merger wave during which the acquisition is announced (Models 7 and 8). 
Other variables appear important in explaining acquirers’ short-run abnormal returns. Among others, the 
size of the acquiring institution, measured by the MV of the acquirer 20 days prior to the announcement of 
the deal, is negative and significant in Models 1 to 8 and 12 (albeit the significance level varies across model 
specifications). Prior evidence suggests that larger acquirers are more likely to have exhausted growth 
opportunities and have more overconfident management teams (which are more incentivised to maximise 
their own private benefits by creating large organisations) leading to no synergy gains upon acquisition of 
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rivals (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). The (insignificantly) negative coefficient on DV across 
Models 1 through 8 provides partial support to recent evidence that suggests that financial institutions are 
willing to pay higher premiums in large value deals (Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013). PRV, SBS, and UNL 
appear positive and significant across all models, implying that deals involving private and subsidiary (or 
unlisted) targets yield higher acquirer abnormal returns than deals involving listed targets. CPTL appears as 
positive and statistically significant across Models 3 to 11. This suggests that the market views stronger 
capitalised financial institutions to be in a better position to reap the benefits arising from acquisition.16 
Evidence presented in Table 5, Model 11, suggests that the observed retention of target institution’s 
management team during the post-acquisition period has a significantly positive impact on the returns of 
acquirers during the announcement period. The coefficient TMGT_RTN (target management retention) 
appears positive and highly statistically significant in Model 11. When compared to the coefficient EA in 
Models 1-3 and 7-9 (inclusive), it appears much larger (0.060 versus, approximately, 0.019). This suggests 
that the market reacts positively to earnout financed deals that are expected to retain the target’s management 
team in the post-acquisition period. 
Overall, our regression analysis demonstrates that the use of earnout financing in acquisitions involving 
financial institutions yields significant higher short-run returns to acquiring institutions, compared to similar 
deals using non-earnout payment methods. Furthermore, earnout financed acquisitions are associated with 
higher (lower) announcement period abnormal returns when the target’s management team is (is not) 
expected to be retained in the post-acquisition period. 
 
Analysis of long-run abnormal returns 
Our second hypothesis, predicts that acquirers using earnout contracts experience higher long-run abnormal 
returns than their counterparts using non-earnout methods of payment. In order to address this, we replicate 
the previous analysis based on PSM (and univariate) and multivariate analyses with acquirers’ long-run 
abnormal returns (BHAR) and report the results in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 (Panel A) shows the univariate 
analysis results. Consistent with our previous findings, the pattern of these results shows that deals that make 
use of earnout contracts enjoy higher long-run abnormal returns than their counterparts using non-earnout 
payment methods. This is evident during the analysis of BHAR over the period of 24 months following the 
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acquisition announcement. Specifically, the BHAR differentials representing the 2-year period examined are 
statistically significant, especially in earnout versus stock financed deals (15.05%). This result is consistent 
with findings from the earlier non-financial firm M&A literature. Furthermore, Panel B shows that when the 
benchmark portfolio using the PSM method (accompanied with RB), the portfolio of acquisitions where 
earnout contracts are used outperforms counterpart portfolios where earnout contracts are not used. 
Specifically, results reported in Panel B confirm the higher abnormal returns of the earnout portfolio in the 
post-acquisition period (especially in the two years following the acquisition announcement). These findings 
suggest that in financial firm M&A deals where earnout contracts are used the returns to acquirers 
outperform counterparts using non-contingent methods of payment. The long-term returns associated with 
the use of earnout contracts in M&A appear to be rooted in lower merger valuation risk and superior 
performance of the target during the integration period as a result of the retention of management. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
Table 7 presents the results of our regression analysis of the determinants of acquirers’ long-run 
abnormal returns (based on Equation 5). To avoid possible multi-collinearity between different sets of 
covariates, Equation 8 is estimated in nested (reduced) form with various combinations of covariates. The 
results obtained from the cross-sectional analysis show the positive impact of the use of earnout contracts on 
the post-acquisition returns of acquirers. The EA coefficient is positive and significant in Model 5, consistent 
with the univariate analysis. Over the same period, our findings indicate that high-REAV earnout financed 
deals yield positive and significant abnormal returns (Model 8). This is consistent with the view that the 
earnout contributes in delivering superior long-run returns in risky-deals. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
One of the most important findings discussed in this section is related to the impact of the target 
institution’s retained management team in the post-acquisition period on acquirers’ long-run abnormal 
returns. Models 2, 6 and 10 show that in deals where the target institution’s management team are retained 
acquirers’ long-run returns are significantly higher. Specifically, the TMGT_RTN coefficients in Models 2, 6 
and 10 increase from 0.14 (1year) to 0.26 (2-years) and to 0.31 (3-years), further indicating the significant 
impact of target’s management retention during the post-acquisition period on the long-run abnormal returns 
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of acquirers using earnout contracts. These results reflect the likely impact of earnout financing in reducing 
potential moral hazard issues in the post-acquisition period. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We present new evidence on the short- and long-run abnormal returns of acquirers for a large sample of 
acquisitions involving US financial institutions financed with earnout (contingent) versus non-earnout (non-
contingent) payments. Using propensity score matching (PSM) to deal with selection bias concerns we find 
that acquirers enjoy higher short-run abnormal returns where earnout contract are used compared to 
conventional methods of payment (such as full-in-cash, or full-in-stock, or a combination of cash and stock 
payments). These returns are larger in acquisitions of unlisted targets, domestic targets, and where both 
merging financial institutions are based in the same mid-industry segment. 
Our results also show that the size of the earnout contract (size of the deferred payment as a fraction of 
the total transaction value) has a positive and significant impact on the short-run returns of acquirers. In 
addition, acquirers enjoy higher short-run abnormal returns when the management team of the target is 
retained after the acquisition. 
The results of the long-run analysis suggest that acquirers employing earnout financing enjoy 
significantly higher returns in the post-acquisition period. While these returns are sensitive to several firm- 
and transaction-specific characteristics, the retention of the target’s management plays an important role in 
enhancing the returns of acquirers during the three-year post-acquisition period, which is approximately the 
average length of earnout contracts in deals involving financial firms. Overall, the higher acquirer abnormal 
returns associated with earnout contracts in acquisitions involving financial institutions appear to be 
associated with the size of the deferred payment of the earnout contract and the retention of target 
management. 
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Table 1 
Acquisition Activity by Location of Target and Method of Payment 
The table presents the activity of acquisitions involving financial institutions according to the target institution’s domicile (Domestic 
versus CBA), merging institutions mid-industry segments (DMIS and SMIS), and the currency of financing (earnout, and non-
earnout which includes cash, stock and mixed payments). Appendix A provides definitions of the variables. 
 
Year All DOM CBA SMIS DMIS EA NEA Cash Stock Mixed 
1986 55 54 1 49 6 0 55 9 36 10 
1987 57 55 2 47 10 0 57 13 33 11 
1988 32 32 0 29 3 0 32 9 18 5 
1989 75 75 0 64 11 0 75 22 47 6 
1990 44 44 0 37 7 0 44 16 21 7 
1991 60 60 0 52 8 0 60 11 33 16 
1992 118 117 1 102 16 4 114 21 64 29 
1993 187 185 2 149 38 3 184 47 115 22 
1994 232 232 0 198 34 5 227 61 130 36 
1995 160 160 0 145 15 1 159 39 96 24 
1996 155 151 4 133 22 2 153 40 94 19 
1997 241 236 5 197 44 4 237 48 159 30 
1998 237 232 5 188 49 8 229 32 187 10 
1999 175 172 3 132 43 9 166 25 123 18 
2000 146 138 8 103 43 4 142 35 82 25 
2001 129 128 1 87 42 6 123 38 54 31 
2002 96 94 2 69 27 4 92 33 25 34 
2003 136 134 2 106 30 6 130 43 36 51 
2004 137 133 4 109 28 5 132 40 32 60 
2005 143 139 4 100 43 8 135 46 29 60 
2006 151 146 5 100 51 3 148 64 28 56 
2007 114 102 12 82 32 6 108 29 19 60 
2008 63 60 3 48 15 9 54 20 17 17 
2009 30 25 5 18 12 0 30 8 11 11 
Total 2,973 2,904 69 2,344 629 87 2,886 749 1,489 648 
% 100 97.7 2.3 78.8 21.2 2.9 97.1 25.2 50.1 21.8 
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Table 2 
Acquisitions Activity by Mid-Industry Segment 
The table presents the mid-industry segments (where the macro-industry for all acquisitions is ‘Financial’) for both acquirers 
(vertically) and targets (horizontally). The table is divided into three panels. Panel A presents the full sample. Panel B presents only 
acquisitions financed with non-earnout payment methods. Panel C presents only acquisitions financed with earnout payment 
methods. The diagonal in each panel presents the number of acquisition in the same mid-industry segment (SMIS). Other than the 
diagonal represents acquisitions in different mid-industry segments (DMIS). 
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Panel A: All acquisitions 
Alternative Financial Investments (AFI) 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 7 15 
Asset Management (AM) 1 30 7 5 2 1 3 18 67 
Banks (BANK) 1 23 1,981 31 26 6 18 152 2,238 
Brokerage (BROK) 1 9 7 49 3 2 2 10 83 
Credit Institutions (CI) 0 2 4 2 20 0 2 5 35 
Diversified Financials (DF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insurance (INS) 0 9 6 11 5 0 205 11 247 
Other Financials (OF) 1 11 166 13 8 4 13 72 288 
Total 6 86 2,172 112 65 13 244 275 2,973 
Panel B: Only non-earnout (NEA) acquisitions 
Alternative Financial Investments (AFI) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 10 
Asset Management (AM) 1 22 7 4 1 1 2 8 46 
Banks (BANK) 1 22 1,975 30 21 6 15 148 2,218 
Brokerage (BROK) 1 7 7 46 3 2 2 10 78 
Credit Institutions (CI) 0 2 4 2 18 0 2 4 32 
Diversified Financials (DF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insurance (INS) 0 9 6 11 5 0 188 9 228 
Other Financials (OF) 1 7 165 13 6 3 12 67 274 
Total 5 70 2,165 107 54 12 221 252 2,886 
Panel C: Only earnout (EA) acquisitions 
Alternative Financial Investments (AFI) 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 
Asset Management (AM) 0 8 0 1 1 0 1 10 21 
Banks (BANK) 0 1 6 1 5 0 3 4 20 
Brokerage (BROK) 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 5 
Credit Institutions (CI) 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 
Diversified Financials (DF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insurance (INS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 2 19 
Other Financials (OF) 0 4 1 0 2 1 1 5 14 
Total 1 16 7 5 11 1 23 23 87 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics. Panel A presents the acquisition activity by target status and method of payment, merging institutions mid-industry segments (DMIS versus SMIS), and 
target institution’s domicile (domestic versus CBA). The sample comprises of acquisitions announced by US acquiring institutions between 01/01/1986 and 31/12/2009 and recorded by the 
Security Data Corporation (SDC). Targets are financial institutions, private, public, and subsidiary ones, operate both in the domestic and in the foreign economy. In Panel A: N represents the 
number of deals; % of total is the proportion of the acquisitions in this group with respect to all acquisitions. Appendix A provides definitions of the variables. 
 
Panel A 
  All EA NEA Cash Stock Mixed SMIS DMIS DOM CBA 
All 
N 2,973 87 2,886 749 1,489 648 2,359 614 2,904 69 
% of All - 2.9 97.1 25.2 50.1 21.8 79.4 20.6 97.7 2.3 
Mean of DV (in ml $) 458.7 295.5 463.6 177.3 592.7 498.1 396.0 699.7 447.2 940.9 
Sum of DV (in bn $) 1,364 26 1,338 133 882 323 934 430 1,299 65 
Unlisted (UNL) Target 
N 1,596 85 1,511 506 678 327 1,209 387 1547 49 
% of All 53.7 2.9 50.8 17.0 22.8 11.0 40.1 13.0 52.0 1.7 
Mean of DV (in ml $) 145.3 294.5 136.9 182.9 51.7 242.2 110.9 252.7 131.8 570.5 
Sum of DV (in bn $) 232 25 207 93 35 79 134 98 204 28 
Listed (PUB) Target 
N 1,377 2 1,375 243 811 321 1,150 227 1357 20 
% of All 46.3 0.1 46.3 8.2 27.3 10.8 38.7 7.6 45.6 0.7 
Mean of DV (in ml $) 821.9 337.5 822.6 165.4 1,044.9 758.7 695.7 1,461.8 806.8 1,848.2 
Sum of DV (in bn $) 1,132 1 1,131 40 847 244 800 332 1,095 37 
Panel B 
 MV (in Mil $) MTBV RS DV (in Mil $) EAV (in Mil $) REAV EALGTH 
 mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median 
All 4,826.16 466.37 0.35 1.52 0.39 0.10 458.69 39.24 75.21 13.00 0.30 0.27 38.66 36.00 
DOM 4,096.20 453.09 1.30 1.51 0.36 0.11 447.23 38.23 75.46 12.33 0.30 0.27 38.66 36.00 
CBA 35,547.91 5,799.96 -39.08 2.13 1.56 0.05 940.85 156.80 54.00 54.00 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.00 
SMIS 3,956.68 453.46 0.45 1.51 0.39 0.11 395.96 37.57 31.88 9.50 0.26 0.20 40.79 36.00 
DMIS 8,166.72 511.08 -0.01 1.56 0.38 0.09 699.69 48.09 115.66 22.50 0.35 0.33 37.52 36.00 
UNL 3,709.93 343.38 -0.89 1.52 0.35 0.08 145.28 23.00 76.37 11.65 0.31 0.28 38.66 36.00 
PUB 6,119.91 693.72 1.74 1.52 0.43 0.14 821.94 79.02 26.25 26.25 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 
EA 7,149.98 345.80 2.49 1.80 0.29 0.12 295.47 50.00 75.21 13.00 0.30 0.27 38.66 36.00 
NEA 4,756.10 468.20 0.29 1.52 0.39 0.10 463.61 38.91 - - - - - - 
Cash (only NEA) 6,804.34 393.01 -2.27 1.43 0.32 0.09 177.25 32.10 - - - - - - 
Stock (only NEA) 4,053.54 503.57 0.96 1.56 0.46 0.09 592.67 39.00 - - - - - - 
Mixed (only NEA) 4,002.99 397.56 1.66 1.48 0.32 0.15 498.06 49.02 - - - - - - 
 
  26	
Table 4 
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns of Acquirers (offering Earnout vs. NEA (Control) Acquisitions 
based on the PSM Method) 
This table reports announcement period abnormal returns.  
Panel A presents the output of the logistic regression that used in the PSM technique (see Appendix A for the 
definition of each variable). Pseudo R-Squared is a likelihood-based measure. HL Goodness-of-Fit refers to the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) goodness-of-fit test on the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the 
‘observed’ and ‘predicted’ values of the depended variable (i.e. there is no lack of fit). VIF is the Variance 
Inflation Factor which quantifies the severity of multicollinearity. Variance inflation is the reciprocal of tolerance. 
Panel B shows the outcome of the Rosenbaum-bounds test.  
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics based on the 1:1, 3:1 and 10:1 Matching Ratio (MR) only for 1% 
Absolute Probability Difference (APD). APD is a value between 0 and 1 that provides the allowable absolute 
difference of the propensity scores between the earnout and non-earnout groups. MR is a value from 1 to N for N:1 
non-earnout to earnout matching. The MR represents the number of deals selected from the untreated (or non-
earnout) group per deal in the earnout (treated) group. For example 1:1 or 10:1 MR matches 1 or 10 untreated 
deals per treated one. For each continuous variable (MV, DV, RS, Age, Capital), the mean of each of them for the 
corresponding treated (earnout) and untreated (non-earnout) group, as well as the differential between the treated 
(earnout) and the untreated (non-earnout) groups in each case is presented; statistical significance of difference in 
means for each variable is tested using the t-test of equality of means.  
Panel D presents the acquiring institution’s announcement period abnormal returns for each group (both earnout 
and matched/non-earnout groups). Announcement period, 5-day (t-2,t+2), abnormal returns (in percent) of all 
groups of acquirers. Abnormal returns (AR) are market adjusted returns (see Equation 1 in text).APD is a value 
between 0 and 1 that provides the allowable absolute difference of the propensity scores between the earnout and 
non-earnout groups. MR is a value from 1 to N for N:1 non-earnout to earnout matching. The MR represents the 
number of deals selected from the untreated (or non-earnout) group per deal in the earnout (treated) group. For 
example 1:1 or 10:1 MR matches 1 or 10 untreated deals per treated one.  
Panel E presents differentials of abnormal returns between the earnout group and each of the matched acquisitions 
groups from the non-earnout sample. Statistical significance of the means and their differences are tested using t-
test. N refers to number of observations in each group or portfolio. 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression Output 
Intercept -4.663***  
Age -0.073  
MV 0.033  
DV 0.079  
PRV 1.215***  
CBA -2.006**  
DMIS -0.080  
CPTL 0.353***  
Asset Management (AM) 1.255***  
Bank (BANK) -3.043***  
Brokerage (BROK) -0.829  
Credit Institutions (CI) 0.522  
Insurance (INS) 0.054  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  
Pseudo (McFadden) R-Squared (in %) 25.97  
HL Goodness-of-fit Test 9.8690  
HL Goodness-of-fit Test [Pr > Chi-Squared] 0.2743  
Mean VIF 2.76  
Mean Tolerance 0.59  
N 2,973  
Panel B: Rosenbaum Bound 
Treated Sample Mean 2.54***  
N 87  
Control Sample Mean (APD = 1%; MR = N:1) 0.02  
N 83  
Mean Difference 2.52***  
RB: p-value of estimated difference at Γ = 1 0.0032  
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p = 0.05 1.35  
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p = 0.10 1.53  
 
Continued (Table 4) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Traded (EA) versus Control (NEA) Samples Statistics 
 
EA 
(Treated 
Group) 
NEA 
(Control 
Group) 
APD = 1% 
MR = 1:1 
NEA 
(Control 
Group) 
APD = 1% 
MR = 3:1 
NEA 
 (Control 
Group) 
APD = 1% 
MR = 5:1 
NEA 
 (Control 
Group) 
APD = 1% 
MR = 10:1 
Total (N) 87 83 240 360 550 
DOM (N) 86 81 236 354 541 
CBA (N) 1 2 4 6 9 
SMIS (N) 42 35 106 154 239 
DMIS (N) 45 48 134 206 311 
PRV (N) 60 58 168 234 308 
SBS (N) 25 8 25 40 78 
UNL (N) 85 66 193 274 386 
PUB (N) 2 17 47 86 164 
Mean MV 7,150 6,118 6,741 6,171 6,500 
Mean Difference (EA vs. NEA) - 1,032 409 979 650 
t-stat of difference (EA vs. NEA) - (0.22) (0.11) (0.29) (0.21) 
Mean DV 296 566 872 807 944 
Mean Difference (EA vs. NEA) - -270 -576 -511 -648 
t-stat of difference (EA vs. NEA) - (-0.77) (-0.95) (-1.00) (-1.24) 
Mean RS 0.29 0.61 0.53 0.45 0.42 
Mean Difference (EA vs. NEA) - -0.32 -0.24 -0.16 -0.13 
t-stat of difference (EA vs. NEA) - (-0.78) (-0.63) (-0.52) (-0.50) 
Mean Age 3,971 3,458 3,961 4,034 4,389 
Mean Difference (EA vs. NEA) - 513 10 -63 -418 
t-stat of difference (EA vs. NEA) - (1.01) (0.02) (-0.16) (-1.05) 
Mean CPTL 26.61 26.52 22.86 21.28 19.27 
Mean Difference (EA vs. NEA) - 0.09 3.75 5.33* 7.34* 
t-stat of difference (EA vs. NEA) - (0.02) (1.29) (1.77) (1.81) 
Panel D: Treated (EA) and Control (NEA) Samples Announcement period Abnormal Normal 
Earnout (Treated) Group  
Mean 2.54*** - - - - 
t-stat (3.38) - - - - 
N 87 - - - - 
Non-Earnout (Control) Group  
Mean - 0.02 1.02*** 0.82*** 0.78*** 
t-stat - (0.03) (2.81) (2.71) (3.20) 
N - 83 240 360 550 
Panel E: Differentials: Treated (EA) versus Control (NEA) Acquisitions 
Mean Difference (Treated vs. Control) - 2.52*** 1.52** 1.72*** 1.76*** 
  t-stat - (2.66) (2.03) (2.80) (2.68) 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of Announcement Period Abnormal Returns of Acquirers: A Cross Sectional Analysis 
This table reports announcement period (5-days) excess returns of acquirers are regressed against a set of explanatory variables. Equation (7) is estimated using ordinary least square. 
 
1
N
i i i
i
CAR Xa e
=
= + +å   
The intercept (α) measures the excess returns to acquirers after accounting for the effects of all explanatory variables. ‘X’ represents the vector of explanatory variables (see Section 3.4 for more details with respect the 
impact of each variable on acquirers’ abnormal returns and also Appendix A for the definitions of each variable). The standard errors are corrected for possible heteroscedasticity by using the White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors method. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Constant 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.006 
AGE -0.003** -0.003** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
MV -0.002** -0.002** -0.001* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001* -0.001*    
DV -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
RS         0.001 0.001 0.001 
MTBV 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
PRV 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014***    
SBS 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.026***    
UNL         0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
CBA 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
DVRSFN -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
EA 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.019**    0.019** 0.020** 0.019**   
EALGTH  -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.004  -0.033* 
CPTL   0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
REAV    0.058***       0.157** 
High_REAV     0.028***       
Low_REAV      0.002      
MWD       -0.007*** -0.007***    
MWD × EA        -0.007    
CODM         -0.009* -0.010* -0.004 
TMGT_RTN           0.060*** 
F-Test 18.79*** 17.03*** 17.21*** 17.48*** 17.42*** 16.67*** 16.51*** 15.25*** 10.66*** 20.66*** 13.75*** 
R2 (adj.) in % 5.94 5.98 6.61 6.71 6.69 6.42 6.90 6.91 3.83 5.82 5.49 
N 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,933 
 
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Table 6 
Long-run Abnormal Returns (Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal-Returns - BHARs) of Acquirers (Earnout vs. Control Non-Earnout) 
This table reports acquirers’ post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 12 months (1-year), 24 months (2-years) and 36 months (3-years) following the month of the 
acquisition announcement are presented. BHARs are estimated based on the methods outlined in the Section 3.3. The benchmark portfolio or the control firm in the estimation of BHARs is the 
market index in Equation 5 (Panel A) or derived via the PSM method in Equation 6 (Panel B). In panel B the matching portfolio is designed on the basis of 1:1, 3:1, 5:1 and 10:1 Matching 
Ratio (MR) only for 1% Absolute Probability Difference (APD) (see Appendix A for the definition of each variable). APD is a value between 0 and 1 that provides the allowable absolute 
difference of the propensity scores between the earnout and non-earnout groups. MR is a value from 1 to N for N:1 non-earnout to earnout matching. The MR represents the number of deals 
selected from the untreated (or non-earnout) group per deal in the earnout (treated) group. For example 1:1 or 10:1 MR matches 1 or 10 untreated deals per treated one. In both panels statistical 
significance of the means and their differences are tested using t-test. N refers to number of observations in each portfolio. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
 
Panel A: BHARs based on Equation 5 
 
  All NEA Cash Stock Mixed EA EA vs. NEA EA vs. Cash EA vs. Stock EA vs. Mixed 
1 year post-
acquisition 
window 
Mean -2.42*** -2.49*** 0.47 -4.99*** -0.18 0.08 2.57 -0.39 5.07 0.26 
t-stat (-3.94) (-4.05) (0.40) (-5.83) (-0.14) (0.02) (0.70) (-0.10) (1.56) (0.07) 
N 2,971 2,885 749 1,489 647 86     
2 years post-
acquisition 
window 
Mean -4.10*** -4.42*** -0.51 -8.01*** -0.67 7.04 11.46*** 7.55* 15.05*** 7.71* 
t-stat (-4.41) (-4.72) (-0.27) (-6.45) (-0.32) (1.06) (2.43) (1.72) (3.04) (1.64) 
N 2,966 2,883 749 1,488 646 83     
3 years post-
acquisition 
window 
Mean -4.40*** -4.56*** -3.24 -4.72*** -5.73** 1.32 5.88 4.56 6.04 7.05 
t-stat (-3.69) (-3.81) (-1.29) (-2.96) (-2.22) (0.14) (0.81) (0.56) (0.85) (0.89) 
N 2,960 2,878 747 1,486 648 82     
 
Panel B: BHARs (Earnout only) - based on Equation 6 
 
  MR=1:1 MR=1:3 MR=1:5 MR=1:10 
1 year post-
acquisition 
window 
Mean 7.13 5.02 2.78 4.36* 
t-stat (1.02) (1.30) (0.87) (1.66) 
N 82 237 354 549 
2 years post-
acquisition 
window 
Mean 17.60** 15.67*** 12.10*** 10.30*** 
t-stat (2.15) (2.67) (2.65) (2.89) 
N 79 228 339 518 
3 years post-
acquisition 
window 
Mean 1.80 7.14 7.32 6.19 
t-stat (0.13) (0.89) (1.16) (1.36) 
N 76 223 331 516 
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Table 7 
Determinants of Long-Run Abnormal Returns (BHARs) of Acquirers: A Cross Sectional Analysis 
This table reports regression results of long-run abnormal returns to acquirers on explanatory variables. Acquirers’ post-acquisition buy-and-hold abnormal returns for 12 months, 24 months and 
36 months following the month of the acquisition announcement are regressed on a set of explanatory variables using Equation 8 (see Section 3 for more details with respect the impact of each 
variable on acquirers’ abnormal returns and the set-up of the model; and Appendix A for the definitions of each variable). In Models 1–4 (5–8) [9–12], the dependent variable is 12 (24) [36] 
month BHARs. Equation (8) is estimated using ordinary least squares. 
 
a e
=
= + +å
1
N
i i i
i
BHAR X   
The intercept (α) measures the excess returns to acquirers after accounting for the effects of all explanatory variables. ‘X’ represents the vector of explanatory variables (see Section 3.4 for more 
details with respect the impact of each variable on acquirers’ returns and also Appendix A for the definitions of each variable). The standard errors are corrected for possible heteroscedasticity by 
using the White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors method. 
 
 1 year post-acquisition window 2 years post-acquisition window 3 years post-acquisition window 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Constant 0.060 0.066 0.054 0.054 0.160* 0.174* 0.138 0.0148* 0.255** 0.281** 0.240** 0.249** 
AGE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.013 -0.016 -0.013 -0.014 
MV -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 
DV -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.019** -0.019** -0.018** -0.018** -0.014 -0.016* -0.013 -0.014 
MTBV 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
UNL -0.034** -0.034** -0.031** -0.032** -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.077*** -0.080*** -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.105*** -0.106*** 
CBA 0.091** 0.091** 0.087** 0.088** 0.049 0.050 0.035 0.040 -0.018 -0.018 -0.024 -0.022 
DVRSFN 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
EA 0.043    0.165**    0.106    
EALGTH 0.001    0.008    0.006    
CPTL -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.012 -0.013 -0.003 -0.006 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.013 
CODM   -0.024    0.015    0.101  
High_REAV    0.008    0.013*    0.112 
TMGT_RTN  0.141**    0.259***    0.314***   
F-Test 1.75* 2.28** 1.96** 1.82* 3.21*** 3.50*** 2.59*** 2.97*** 3.06*** 3.92*** 3.35*** 3.27*** 
R2 (adj.) in % 0.65 0.78 0.68 0.67 1.29 1.19 0.97 1.07 0.96 1.33 1.22 1.29 
N 2,973 2,933 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,933 2,973 2,973 2,973 2,933 2,973 2,973 
 
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
This table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis, and indicates the data source used. SDC denotes 
Thomson-Reuters SDC M&A database. With a dummy variable, a sample observation without the value of 1 has 
the value of 0. Age, MV, DV, EAV, CPTL, EALGTH, and RS are log transformed in subsequent regressions. 
 
Variable Type / Name Description Data source 
All Refers to the entire sample analysed in this paper. SDC 
Age Number of days between day the acquirer is first recorded on Datastream and acquisition’s announcement day. Datastream 
Market Value (MV) Acquirer’s market value of equity at four weeks prior to acquisition’s announcement, in millions dollars. Datastream 
Deal Value (DV) Acquisition’s transaction value, in millions dollars. SDC 
Earnout Value (EAV) Value of earnout contract, in millions dollars (proxy for size of earnout). SDC 
Relative Size (RS) Ratio of DV to MV. Datastream & SDC 
Relative EAV (REAV) Ratio of EAV to DV. SDC 
Market-to-book value 
(MTBV) 
Market-to-book value of acquirer equity at four weeks, and book value of 
equity from the most recent accounting statement, prior to acquisition’s 
announcement day. 
Datastream 
EA length (EALGTH) The log of the earnout period is following the acquisition’s announcement day (in months). 
LexisNexis & 
InvestEgate 
Capital (CPTL) 
The CPTL variable is computed as follows for the different types of 
financial institutions: (a) Banks: common equity / (total assets – 
customer liabilities on acceptances); (b) Insurance companies: (common 
equity + policyholders’ equity) / total assets; (c) Other financial 
companies: common equity / (total assets – custody securities). 
Datastream 
Foreign (CBA) Dummy = 1 with a US acquirer and non-US target, and = 0 when both acquirer and target are US institutions (= DOM). SDC 
Diversifying (DVRSFN) 
Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target are based in different mid-industry 
segments (DMIS), and = 0 when both are based in the same mid-industry 
segment (SMIS) (= Focused). 
SDC 
Cash Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% cash. SDC 
Stock Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% stock exchange. SDC 
Mixed Dummy = 1 when payment is mixture of cash, stock, and other methods of payment excluding earnout. SDC 
Earnout (EA) Dummy = 1 when payment includes earnout in addition to cash, stock, or mixed, and = 0 otherwise (= Non-Earnout) (NEA). SDC 
Non-Earnout (NEA) Dummy = 1 with full-cash, or full-stock, or mixed payment without EA, and = 0 when EA is included. SDC 
Private (PRV) Dummy = 1 if target is private, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Public (PBL) Dummy = 1 if target is publicly listed, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Subsidiary (SBS) Dummy = 1 if target is a subsidiary institution, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Unlisted (UNL) Dummy = 1 if target is unlisted i.e. private or subsidiary, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Alternative Financial 
Investments (AFI) 
Dummy = 1 if both merging-partners are in the Alternative Financial 
Investments sub-sector, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Asset Management (AM) Dummy = 1 if both merging-partners are in the Asset Management sub-sector, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Banks (BANK) Dummy = 1 if both merging-partners are in the Banking sub-sector, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Brokerage (BROK) Dummy = 1 if both merging-partners are in the Brokerage sub-sector, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Credit Institutions (CI) Dummy = 1 if both merging-partners are in the Credit Institutions sub-sector, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Diversified Financials (DF) Dummy = 1 if both merging-partners are in the Diversified Financials sub-sector, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Insurance (INS) Dummy = 1 if both merging-partners are in the Insurance sub-sector, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Other Financials (OF) Dummy = 1 if both merging-partners are in the Other Financials sub-sector, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Low Relative EAV 
(Low_REAV) 
Dummy = 1 if REAV < its median, and = 0 if the REAV ≥ its median. SDC 
High Relative EAV 
(High_REAV) 
Dummy = 1 if REAV > its median, and = 0 if the REAV ≤ its median. SDC 
Control Acquisitions 
Dummy (CODM) 
Dummy = 1 if the acquisition form the non-earnout group is matched 
with an acquisition from the earnout group, based on the PSM method, 
and = 0 otherwise. 
Defined via 
Table 6 Bellow 
Merger Wave Dummy 
(MWD) 
Equals 1 if the acquisition announcement it taking place during the period 
1998-2000, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Target Management 
Retention (TMGT_RTN) 
Equals 1 if the management team of the target firm is retained after the 
acquisition announcement, and = 0 otherwise. 
Factiva and SEC 
Fillings 
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Appendix B 
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns of US Acquirers (Offering Earnout vs. Non-Earnout Payments) 
This table reports announcement period, 5-day (t-2, t+2), abnormal returns (in percent) of all sample acquirers (Panel A) divided by 
target listing status (unlisted -private and subsidiary- and listed), methods of payment (cash, shares, mixed, and earnout), the target 
institution’s domicile (Panels B and C, domestic and foreign respectively), and the acquiring and target institutions’ mid-industry 
segments (Panels D and E, SMIS and DMIS respectively) are presented. See Appendix A for the definitions of the variables. 
Abnormal returns (AR) are market adjusted returns (see Equation 1 in text). Statistical significance of the means and their differences 
are tested using t-test. N refers to number of observations in each portfolio. 
 
  All Earnout NEA Cash Stock Mixed 
Earnout 
vs. 
NEA 
Earnout 
vs. 
Cash 
Earnout 
vs. 
Stock 
Earnout 
vs. 
Mixed 
Panel A: All US Deals 
All Deals 
Mean 0.06 2.54*** -0.02 0.66*** -0.40*** 0.08 2.56*** 1.88*** 2.94*** 2.46*** 
t-stat (0.63) (3.38) (-0.16) (3.55) (-3.12) (0.41) (4.56) (3.11) (5.25) (3.88) 
N 2,973 87 2,886 749 1,489 648     
Private 
(PRV) 
Targets 
Mean 0.70*** 2.17** 0.63*** 0.38* 0.53*** 1.14*** 1.54** 1.79*** 1.64** 1.03 
t-stat (5.04) (2.35) (4.53) (1.76) (2.74) (3.62) (2.37) (2.63) (2.36) (1.30) 
N 1,242 60 1,182 293 632 257     
Subsidiary 
(SBS) 
Targets 
Mean 1.98*** 3.84*** 1.84*** 1.80*** 1.12 2.41*** 2.00 2.04 2.72* 1.43 
t-stat (5.54) (2.82) (4.98) (3.83) (1.33) (2.96) (1.44) (1.41) (1.79) (0.90) 
N 354 25 329 213 46 70     
Unlisted 
(UNL) 
Targets 
Mean 0.99*** 2.66*** 0.89*** 0.98*** 0.57*** 1.42*** 1.77*** 1.68** 2.09*** 1.24* 
t-stat (7.31) (3.48) (6.58) (4.00) (3.01) (4.66) (2.95) (2.49) (3.48) (1.75) 
N 1,596 85 1,511 506 678 327     
Listed 
(PUB) 
Targets 
Mean -1.01*** -2.41 -1.01*** 0.00 -1.21*** -1.27*** -1.40 -2.41 -1.19 -1.14 
t-stat (-8.02) (-0.82) (-7.99) (0.01) (-7.19) (-4.78) (-0.48) (-0.83) (-0.41) (-0.39) 
N 1,377 2 1,375 243 811 321     
Panel B: US Deals of Domestic (DOM) Target Institutions 
All Deals 
Mean 0.05 2.40*** -0.03 0.69*** -0.42*** 0.09 2.43*** 1.71*** 2.82*** 2.31*** 
t-stat (0.48) (3.21) (-0.27) (3.57) (-3.34) (0.41) (4.33) (2.77) (5.10) (3.66) 
N 2,904 86 2,818 714 1,472 632     
Private 
(PRV) 
Targets 
Mean 0.64*** 1.95** 0.58*** 0.37 0.49*** 1.04*** 1.37** 1.58** 1.46** 0.91 
t-stat (4.68) (2.14) (4.22) (1.49) (2.59) (3.25) (2.15) (2.31) (2.19) (1.15) 
N 1,217 59 1,158 287 622 249     
Subsidiary 
(SBS) 
Targets 
Mean 2.09*** 3.84*** 1.95*** 1.94*** 1.13 2.50*** 1.89 1.90 2.71* 1.34 
t-stat (5.52) (2.82) (4.94) (3.78) (1.32) (2.98) (1.34) (1.26) (1.77) (0.84) 
N 330 25 305 194 44 67     
Unlisted 
(UNL) 
Targets 
Mean 0.95*** 2.51*** 0.86*** 1.00*** 0.53*** 1.35*** 1.65*** 1.51** 1.98*** 1.16* 
t-stat (7.01) (3.31) (6.32) (3.91) (2.87) (4.36) (2.76) (2.19) (3.40) (1.68) 
N 1,547 84 1,463 481 666 316     
Listed 
(PUB) 
Targets 
Mean -0.99*** -2.41 -0.98*** 0.05 -1.21*** -1.18*** -1.43 -2.46 -1.20 -1.23 
t-stat (-7.76) (-0.82) (-7.73) (0.20) (-7.15) (-4.44) (-0.49) (-0.85) (-0.41) (-0.42) 
N 1,357 2 1,355 233 806 316     
Panel C: US Deals of Foreign (CBA) Target Institutions 
All Deals 
Mean 0.62 15.07 0.41 0.04 1.54 0.02 14.66 15.03 13.53 15.05 
t-stat (0.76) - (0.51) (0.07) (0.61) (0.01) - - - - 
N 69 1 68 35 17 16     
Unlisted 
(UNL) 
Targets 
Mean 2.06** 15.07 1.79* 0.53 3.02 3.31* 13.28 14.54 12.04 11.76 
t-stat (2.13) - (1.89) (1.03) (0.89) (2.10) - - - - 
N 49 1 48 25 12 11     
Listed 
(PUB) 
Targets 
Mean -2.91** - -2.91** -1.19 -2.02 -7.24** - - - - 
t-stat (-2.47) - (-2.47) (-0.98) (-0.71) (-3.10) - - - - 
N 20 0 20 10 5 5     
 
Continued (Appendix B) 
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Appendix B (Continued) 
 
  All Earnout NEA Cash Stock Mixed 
Earnout 
vs. 
NEA 
Earnout 
vs. 
Cash 
Earnout 
vs. 
Stock 
Earnout 
vs. 
Mixed 
Panel D: US Deals of Same-Mid-Industry Segments (SMIS) 
All Deals 
Mean -0.02 3.56*** -0.08 0.56*** -0.46*** 0.16 3.64*** 3.00*** 4.02*** 3.40*** 
t-stat (-0.18) (3.07) (-0.82) (2.57) (-3.50) (0.68) (3.13) (3.52) (5.34) (2.88) 
N 2,359 42 2,317 553 1,262 502     
Private 
(PRV) 
Targets 
Mean 0.56*** 2.82* 0.49*** 0.20 0.40** 1.05*** 2.33*** 2.62*** 2.42*** 1.77* 
t-stat (3.84) (1.94) (3.43) (0.76) (2.13) (2.98) (2.71) (2.90) (2.76) (1.74) 
N 966 28 938 224 519 195     
Subsidiary 
(SBS) 
Targets 
Mean 2.22*** 5.39** 2.04*** 2.02*** 1.36 2.52*** 3.35* 3.37* 4.03* 2.87* 
t-stat (5.04) (2.67) (4.54) (3.36) (1.20) (3.15) (1.72) (1.70) (1.84) (1.72) 
N 243 13 230 145 33 52     
Unlisted 
(UNL) 
Targets 
Mean 0.89*** 3.64*** 0.79*** 0.92*** 0.46** 1.36*** 2.85*** 2.72*** 3.18*** 2.28** 
t-stat (6.06) (3.07) (5.45) (3.17) (2.42) (4.16) (3.52) (2.86) (4.15) (2.43) 
N 1,209 41 1,168 369 552 247     
Listed 
(PUB) 
Targets 
Mean -0.97*** 0.52 -0.98*** -0.15 -1.18*** -1.01*** 1.50 0.67 1.70 1.53 
t-stat (-7.01) - (-7.01) (-0.52) (-6.60) (-3.21) - - - - 
N 1,150 1 1,149 184 710 255     
Panel E: US Deals of Different-Mid-Industry Segments (DMIS) 
All Deals 
Mean 0.36 1.59* 0.26 0.95*** -0.06 -0.17 1.33* 0.64 1.65* 1.76* 
t-stat (1.55) (1.65) (1.10) (2.62) (-0.14) (-0.35) (1.69) (0.73) (1.72) (1.76) 
N 614 45 569 196 227 146     
Private 
(PRV) 
Targets 
Mean 1.21*** 1.60 1.16*** 0.97* 1.14* 1.43** 0.44 0.63 0.46 0.17 
t-stat (3.30) (1.35) (3.01) (1.66) (1.73) (2.06) (0.37) (0.54) (0.34) (0.13) 
N 276 32 244 69 113 62     
Subsidiary 
(SBS) 
Targets 
Mean 1.45** 2.16 1.36** 1.33* 0.51 2.09 0.80 0.83 1.65 0.07 
t-stat (2.40) (1.23) (2.12) (1.84) (0.62) (0.94) (0.42) (0.44) (0.87) (0.02) 
N 111 12 99 68 13 18     
Unlisted 
(UNL) 
Targets 
Mean 1.28*** 1.75* 1.22*** 1.15** 1.07* 1.58** 0.53 0.60 0.68 0.17 
t-stat (4.08) (1.80) (3.68) (2.48) (1.80) (2.18) (0.53) (0.61) (0.59) (0.14) 
N 387 44 343 137 126 80     
Listed 
(PUB) 
Targets 
Mean -1.21*** -5.33 -1.19*** 0.49 -1.47*** -2.28*** -4.14 -5.82 -3.86 -3.05 
t-stat (-3.99) - (-3.92) (0.90) (-2.85) (-5.31) - - - - 
N 227 1 226 59 101 66     
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Endnotes 
1 Valuation risk in M&A arises from information asymmetry. In order to appropriate a large proportion of any 
benefits arising from the transaction, each party has a strong incentive to propose a price that overvalues itself and 
undervalues the other party. 
2 In recent years, earnout contracts have been used in acquisitions of private targets. Fewer shareholders make the 
use of earnout contracts more straightforward. Earnout contracts have also been used more often in intangible rich 
industries (hi-tech and other service-based industries) where information asymmetry between merging companies 
is high and the value of the target is often dependent on the knowledge, skill, creativity, efforts, and flair of key 
personnel. 
3 DeYoung et al (2009) provide a comprehensive review of the accounting and market based evidence in relation 
to M&A involving financial institutions. More recent evidence is summarised in Beccalli and Frantz (2013). 
4 Brown and Warner (1980) suggest that adjusting for systematic risk, beta, does not improve the precision of the 
short-run abnormal returns. Hence, the use of market-adjusted return does not affect the robustness of our findings. 
5 Although PSM has become a popular method in estimating casual effects in policy impact research, it has been 
only recently used in the finance literature (Saunders and Steffen, 2011; Casu et al, 2013; Karampatsas et al, 2014). 
6 Rosenbaum (2009) provides a detailed discussion of PSM and RB methods. 
7 Our final sample comprises 13 ‘multiple’ acquirers using earnout. These acquirers announce 30 deals in total. 
There are also 57 ‘unique’ acquirers that announce only one deal during the sample period. On average, unique 
acquirers are larger, younger, and have lower MTBV-ratios than multiple acquiring counterparts. Furthermore, 
unique acquirers are involved in larger deals and deals in which a large part of the deal value is contingent on 
future performance. In order to conserve space, we do not report these results. However, these results are available 
from the authors upon request. Furthermore, we identify that 70 (= 13+57) acquirers in our sample involved in 
acquisitions using earnout are also involved in 181 acquisitions that do not use earnout as a method of payment. 
Among them, 37 are unique (involved in only one deal) with the other 33 involved in 144 acquisitions. 
8 The (observed) rapid increase of merger activity can be attributed to several factors, such as: the liberalization of 
trade and investment; deregulation of financial services sector; privatization of state-owned enterprises; relaxation 
of controls regarding capital mobility across many countries; and the integration of international financial markets. 
9 The HL Goodness of fit test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no evidence of a lack of fit (Prob Chi-squared = 
0.2743). HL Goodness-of-Fit refers to the Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) goodness-of-fit test on the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the ‘observed’ and ‘predicted’ values of the depended variable (i.e. 
there is no lack of fit). 
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10 The MR represents the number of deals selected from the untreated (or non-earnout) group per deal in the 
earnout (treated) group. For example 1:1 MR matches one untreated deal to one treated deal, and or 10:1 matches 
ten untreated deals to one treated deal. 
11 The statistical significant difference in CAR means between the earnout (treated) and non-earnout (control or 
untreated) groups becomes negligible at 10% level when a confounding covariate is likely to influence the odds of 
receiving the treatment by 53%. 
12 Only at the 5:1 and 10:1 matching ratio (MR), the mean of ‘CPTL’ appears different between the earnout and 
non-earnout groups, albeit this difference is very weak (at 10% significance level). This is unsurprising given that 
in the 5:1 and 10:1 MR, a large number of observations (acquisitions) from the non-earnout (untreated) group enter 
the matching space. When compared to the earnout group (a very concentrated group of acquisitions), the 
distribution of ‘CPTL’ covariate appears slightly different. Overall, the weak statistical significance between the 
differences in the distributions of ‘CPTL’ suggests that our matching design is efficient. 
13 The lower performance of the control portfolio, compared to earnout financed portfolio, is likely to be driven by 
the inclusion of several acquisitions in the control portfolio that financed with all-in-stock. This reflects well-
documented evidence that all-stock offers, which are included in our non-earnout group, generate negative short-
run returns to acquirers’ shareholders. 
14 Previous studies that investigate the impact of earnout financing on acquires’ returns using samples of non-
financial firms have not addressed the sample selection bias which could have significantly influenced their results. 
As such, we offer an important methodological contribution in the related earnout literature, and more generally in 
the M&A research. 
15 As in the case of univariate analysis, the negative performance of the control-acquisitions group (CODM) 
compared to the earnout group (EA), is likely to be driven from the inclusion of several deals in the control 
portfolio that financed with all-in-stock. 
16 Similar results are discussed by Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010) in their study of determinants of shareholder 
value creation for a large sample of European banks. Specifically, they show that shareholder value is positively 
related with cost-efficiency changes. 
